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Migration, Crisis, Liberalism: the cultural and racial politics of Islamophobia 
and ‘radical alterity’ in modern Greece. 
Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, Durham University UK& Giorgos Tsimouris, Panteion University, Greece1.   
   
Introduction 
The present paper focuses on a critical analysis of the culture-race-migration 
kaleidoscope found in public attitudes and state policies in modern Greece. We take 
Greece as a symptomatic case of the racialised character of national and EU 
immigration policies and discourses. By examining a variety of settings in a period 
that ranges from the early nineteen nineties to the present, we argue in favour of a 
unified analysis of the culturalist, racialist and historically cum economically 
produced conditions of the alterity of the migrant other. We suggest that migrants 
and displaced persons are caught in hierarchies of entitlement and often reduced to 
a perpetual status of allochthony (foreigness) (cf. Silverstein 2005). The complexity 
and shiftiness of contemporary forms of racism (cf. Balibar 2007: 21), led us to 
consider the shared philosophical roots of conservative, right wing and liberal 
political projects (cf. Chudhury 2015). The focus on the economies of desirability 
and undesirability, exclusion and inclusion of migrant others, reveals the need to 
reflect on (neo)liberal visions of ‘modernity’, ‘progress’ and ‘integration’ as decisive 
factors in the conceptualisation of (supra)state-policies and public attitudes to 
migrants. In order to develop and substantiate this argument our paper is organised 
in three distinct sections. The first section touches upon the rise of ultra-nationalism 
and the far-right in Greece and discusses the intimate connections between racial 
                                                          
1 Authors’ names are listed alphabetically. Both authors have contributed equally to the writing of 
this paper and the research involved. The initial ideas of this paper were developed in the Workshop 
‘Race and Crisis’ that took place at the Open University – London, the 15th and 16th of July 2016 in the 
context of the Project “Framing Financial Crisis and Protest: North-West and South East Europe”. We 
are immensely grateful to the participants for their comments and suggestions. 
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and cultural politics of ‘radical alterity’ (cf. Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015). The 
second section proceeds to examine Islamophobia as a variation of the racialised 
attitudes to migrant populations. We examine the spatial politics of the production 
of the Muslim ‘other’ as a partial and potentially dangerous presence and we explain 
the tensions between religious and secular configurations of the Greek state. Taking 
our cue from recent attempts to establish a ‘Euro-Islam’ (cf. Ramadan 2004), we 
examine the distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims and their relation to 
(neo)liberal values of self-transformation. The manner in which (neo) liberal 
governmentalities are implicated in the illegality and deportablity of migrants in 
contexts of new labour relations is further discussed in the third and final section of 
the paper. Taking the Albanian migrant as the most ‘successful’ case of incorporation 
in modern Greek society, we problematize the concept of ‘integration’ and its 
association with universalist visions of European superiority. The paper concludes 
by stressing the role of hegemonic narratives of cosmopolitanism prevalent in Greek 
and European discourses on migration.  
 
A. The coloured people 
While conducting fieldwork with diaspora communities in Athens, in 20142, we 
found ourselves in a taxi on Patision street. Patision–a central Athenian avenue–
connects densely populated, currently impoverished neighbourhoods, once 
inhabited by the middle-classes and now home to various migrant communities. 
“Look Madame! Look!–the taxi driver exclaimed, pointing to pedestrians–the place is 
full of coloured people (gemisame eghromous). The once superb neighbourhoods of 
central Athens are now full of immigrants (metanastes). People are afraid to go out at 
night. Most residents [i.e., Greeks] (katoikoi) have left. It is only the poor and the 
elderly that have nowhere else to go, who continue living here. Black, white, yellow 
                                                          
2 Fieldwork with Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Syrian diaspora in Athens, in 2014, was generously 
funded by Durham University, Seedcorn Fund. The funding was awarded to Dr. Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, 
Dr. Stephen Lyon. Dr. G. Tsimouris, Dr. Daniel Knight & Dr. Maria Kastrinou.  
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(mavroi, asproi, kitrinoi), they all gather here. They drink, they steal, they kill each 
other, fight, prostitute themselves; they show no respect. They occupy every bit of 
space, sometimes sleep on the streets and use the pavements as toilets. Awful mess! 
Central Athens has turned into an awful mess”.  
Focusing on the period between 2009 and 2015, the present section will establish 
that widespread xenophobia is symptomatic of deep-seated, negative attitudes 
towards particular categories of people perceived as ‘foreign’ and by consequence 
regarded as threatening to the Greek nation. Original ethnographic data will be 
discussed against analytical approaches on the production of migrants as a problem 
of cultural and racial difference (cf. Vertovec 2011: 242). By examining literature on 
cultural politics and racialization, we wish to argue that the Greek case is better 
explained through a combined emphasis on cultural and racial essentialism, rather 
than a single-handed focus on any one of the two aspects.  
In May 2013, a cultural group called ‘Atenistas’ organised an open tour in Kypseli, 
one of the most densely populated neighbourhoods off-Patision street. The tour was 
scheduled to end in the premises of a primary school where three ‘famous 
Kypseliots’ (a poet cum writer, a director and an architect) would deliver speeches 
about their neighbourhood. Parts of the speech of the established poet and writer 
Kiki Dimoula became the subject of a bitter public debate due to their xenophobic 
depictions of the current demography of the neighbourhood and its effects to the 
lives of ‘original’ Kypseliots. We will hereby translate the most contentious parts of 
the talk3 and invite the reader to compare their spirit with that of the taxi-driver’s 
comment quoted in the very beginning of this section.  
I live in Kypseli for 76 years; on the very same street. I have lived through the nice years 
of Kypseli (ta oraia hronia tis Kypselis)… Pythias’ street, where I lived, was full of 
beautiful detached houses with gardens, the inhabitants all knew each other. It was 
                                                          
3 The entire speech can be found in Greek here: 
http://www.tanea.gr/news/greece/article/5016105/ti-akribws-eipe-h-kikh-dhmoyla-gia-thn-
kypselh-kai-toys-metanastes/ 
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very picturesque… I still live here, not entirely reconciled with the changes… Let us not 
forget that the foreigners, who found themselves here, did so because of the poverty of 
their countries… But we must state, as well, that they are a constant danger. The locals 
are in danger of being mugged on the street… 42 Pythias’ street, where my sister lives. 
She was hospitalised twice. Twice she was beaten by someone outside her door because 
she could not find her key house quickly enough… Limited cases, yes, but the fear is 
unlimited. I do not mean to say that the foreigners of Kypseli are burglars. But if one 
goes to the square, there is no space to walk. Foreign people sit on the benches –
naturally, they want to pass the time– and they play some strange card games of their 
own and the whole place becomes full of little cards. Of course, the Kypseliots have been 
displaced; this is a fact. Of course we love the foreigners, since they left their countries 
to come and live here, to work, but the spaces need to be somehow distributed4… I have 
become accustomed to foreigners; accustomed to waking up and seeing them. I have 
come across many blacks pushing supermarket trolleys… I wish hunger did not exist, I 
wish all the races of the world were mixed, but here there is a problem now. How are 
these people [referring to ‘foreigners’] supposed to sustain themselves? I am really 
pleased today that I found myself among other Kypseliots. Really pleased. 
Dimoula’s speech metonymically stands for the dominant narrative, prevalent 
among Greek people who reside or visit frequently the impoverished parts of the 
urban centres of Athens where most diaspora communities live. With the striking 
exception of politicised members of pro-migrant activist groups, associated mainly 
with the radical left and/or anarchist circles, the majority of respondents articulated 
stereotypically negative discourses about the ‘migrants’. Foreigners, xenoi5 were 
almost indiscriminately portrayed as a cultural and physical threat to local 
communities and the nation in general (cf. Vertovec 2011: 243; Siliverstein 2005: 
                                                          
4 Dimoula has a perfect command of the language. Her choice of words, grammar and syntax here 
cannot be possibly misunderstood. She does not refer to the ‘sharing’ of space (na moirastoume to 
horo), but to the division, separation or assigning of different spaces to ‘locals’ and ‘foreigners’ (na 
moirastoun oi horoi).  
5 For a discussion of the term xenos (foreigner, outsider) versus dhikos (insider, one of our own) see 
Kirtsoglou 2018; Herzfeld , 2003: 142; Panourgia 1995: 16-17. 
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376). The organising themes of this dominant narrative, the convenient ‘story seeds’ 
(Knight 2013: 153) relate to perceptions of migrants as dangerous, potentially prone 
to criminal activity, as unhealthy and possibly contagious, and as religious and 
cultural misfits that will never ‘assimilate’ (den afomoionontai) in Greek society. 
Their countries of origin are imagined as ‘poor’ and ‘destitute’, while their ‘cultures’ 
are frequently judged as ‘backwards’, ‘inferior’ or lagging modernisation.  
Such narratives about the ‘Other’ do not limit themselves to supporters of the far 
right (cf. Virdee 2014). Different respondents, according to their political affiliation, 
general knowledge and level of religiosity were elaborating on some or all of the 
aforementioned themes. Anti-migrant discourses reflect therefore a whole spectrum 
of positions and often assume the form of ‘dogmas of cultural difference’ (cf. 
Strathern 1995: 16; Vertovec 2011: 244). Virdee’s study of race and English working 
class explains eloquently the manner in which socialist “arguments and struggles to 
secure economic and social justice for the excluded came to be ideologically located 
in the terrain of the nation” that “operated as a power container limiting the political 
imagination…of the representatives of the exploited and the oppressed” (2014: 5). 
Regarding the liberal side of the political spectrum, in a discussion of the shared 
philosophical roots of right wing and liberal political theory, Choudhury argues that 
both strands converge on ideas about civilizational superiority that ultimately 
produce new kinds of racism (2015: 48). The co-constructed character of 
‘culturalist’ and ‘racist’ discourses against immigrants has been first noted by Barker 
who saw the emergence of a “new racism”, hidden “inside apparently innocent 
language about culture (1981: 3). The seemingly ‘incommensurable racial 
difference’ of immigrant populations forms the basis of new ‘racist paradigms’ in 
Europe, whereby biological differences between races, that once formed the 
backbone of racism, are now increasingly expressed in terms of cultural 
incompatibility (cf. Silverstein 2005: 364, 365; Grillo 2003).  
Such culturalist discourses – based on perceptions of cultures as static, essentialised, 
biologised and inherited (cf. Vertovec 2011; Bauman 1996) – need not divert our 
attention from the processes through which migration has become a ‘racialised 
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category’ (Silverstein 2005: 367). The manner in which ‘race’ is implicated with 
migration issues reminds one of Ingold’s concept of the ‘meshwork’, namely of a 
network of interacting concepts, entangled lines of discourse and co-constructed 
ideas about seemingly disparate notions such as ‘culture’, ‘civilisation’, ‘progress’, 
‘modernisation’, ‘descent’, religion, gender and ‘biology’ (to name some, but not all) 
(cf. Ingold 2011: 63). This meshwork of interdependent concepts is not static. On the 
contrary, in line with Ingold’s original idea, it is in a constant state of flux, growth 
and movement (ibid). In this sense, we are in complete agreement with the 
analytical conviction of Kibria, Bowman and O’Leary that the race-migration 
kaleidoscope is a ‘fluid and intertwined bundle of linkages’ (2013: 5), a highly 
complex and complicated political project “rooted in colonialism and imperialism” 
(Erel, Murji & Nahaboo 2016: 1343). The transformation of biological racism into 
cultural, and/or religious racism enabled scholars to realise that ‘race moves’ (ibid; 
cf also Mishra Tarc 2013: 373) and transforms itself independently of ‘the old 
certainties of colour’ (Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2001: 279-301) taking on 
multiple guises. 
Race has been sharply critiqued in analytical and scientific terms. It remains 
nonetheless an organising theme of public discourses and perceptions of the ‘other’ 
in Greece and elsewhere (cf. Silverstein 2005: 364-65; also Balibar and Wallerstein 
1991). When problematising race, we follow Silverstein’s definition of a “cultural 
category of difference that is contextually constructed as essential and natural –as 
residing within  the very body of the individual–[being] thus generally tied, in 
scientific theory and popular understanding to a set of somatic, physiognomic, and 
even genetic and other traits” (2005: 364). These traits may be corresponding to a 
person’s phenotype, or inferred and imagined in ways that render categories such as 
‘whiteness’, ‘blackness’ and everything else ‘in-between’ – so to speak – fluid and 
unstable. The fluidity of race refers not only to cases recorded in the literature, 
namely Eastern European people, Jews or Roma (cf. Barret & Roediger 1997; Mallki 
1992), but also to the everyday politics of banal racial ‘identification’ that prove to 
be highly dependent on other factors, like linguistic fluency, birth-place, or descent. 
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Modern Greeks, for instance would easily joke about how a darker member of the 
family ‘looks like a gypsy’ (cf. also Panourgia 1995), but they would never question 
that person’s rightful belonging to the ‘white race’ (with which they readily identify 
themselves). Similarly, a lighter-skinned Roma, or Asian would still be cast as ‘other’, 
‘foreign’ or person of colour on the basis of their origin, or Greek language skills 
(compare with Vargas-Ramos 2014). A closer look at the ethnographic data suggests 
that rather than race itself (cf. Anthias 1990), it is perceptions of race that matter. 
Ultimately, the manner in which race as a political category is imagined, socially, 
historically and economically constructed, points to the pertinence of the concept of 
racialization that we have employed in our discussion (cf. Gilroy 1987: 38). 
Racialisation refers precisely to those “dynamic and dialectical processes of 
categorisation and meaning construction in which specific meanings are ascribed to 
real or fictitious somatic features” (Wodak and Reisigl 1999: 180; cf. Silverstein 
2005: 364). The ‘racial system’ according to which immigrants and various ‘others’ 
are taxonomically categorised largely corresponds to the hierarchy of entitlements 
imposed onto them in everyday social situations, and in their relations to the state, 
the law and supra-national formations.  
Researchers have long pointed out the racialised character of national and EU 
policies in relation to immigration (cf. Cabot 2014, Erel, Murji & Nahaboo 2016). 
Racialised perceptions of migrants are produced both within every day banal 
contexts of cultural racism, and through policy narratives and categories such as 
illegality and deportability (cf. De Genova 2002; 2010; Hiemstra 2010: 75). The 
current complex European border regime (Green 2013) reveals the role of the EU as 
a ‘racial supra-state’ (Garner 2007: 14; cf. Erel Erel, Murji & Nahaboo 2016: 1344; 
Cole 2009).  State and policy-conceived racialised taxonomies appear to be 
congruent with racialised geographies, establishing a firm connection between 
racialization and colonial histories of the past, as well as, between racialization and 
current asymmetrical structures of extractive economic relations between national 
and supranational entities (cf. Virdee 2014). The meshwork of culture, race, 
civilisation, progress, modernity, religion, gender and ethnicity is – we claim – a 
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(post)colonial technology that permeates state-citizen relations, policy narratives 
and casual sociality. It is a technology that aims at managing difference; sometimes 
by transforming difference into forms of ‘radical and incommensurable alterity’ (cf. 
Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015), and at other times by hegemonically commanding 
the conditions of the ‘Other’s’ integration.  
 
B. Islamophobia and the politics of space 
One of the most shocking ideas in Dimoula’s speech cited in the previous section 
regards the division of public space (na moirastoun oi horoi). Currently, in Greece 
and elsewhere, the politics of distribution of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees 
is a field where state policies both produce (cf. Shore and Wright 1997) and are 
inspired by various xenophobic and segregationalist narratives that coagulate 
chiefly around Islamophobia as yet another expression of the racialization of certain 
populations (Levey and Modood 2009: 241; Fulcher and Scott 2003). The present 
section builds on ethnographic data gathered jointly by the co-authors in 2015 and 
2016 in Athens6. Our primary aim is to comment on the effects of racialised 
Islamophobia as a form of ‘radical alterity’ following the thought of scholars who 
argue that ‘religion is raced’ (Vakil 2010: 276; cf. also Mandel et.al., 2015; Sayyid and 
Vakil 2010). We also wish to touch upon the gendered aspects of these racialised 
perceptions of Islam (cf. Triandafyllidou 2001) and to discuss the importance of 
spatial politics in the development of Islamophobic discourses and attitudes in the 
public sphere. We will introduce the importance of neoliberal understandings of 
personhood in the construction of interconnected false dichotomies between ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ Islam, and between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants. The role of neoliberal 
ideologies as disciplining technologies productive of further hierarchies of 
entitlement will be further explored in the third and final section of this paper.  
                                                          
6 This research was part of the ESRC/DFID-funded project Transitory Lives (October 2015 – July 
2017).   
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In December 2015 we found ourselves conducting fieldwork in Victoria square, 
located not very far away from Patision street. Due to its direct public transport 
connection with the port of Piraeus, where most refugees who crossed from Turkey7 
eventually arrived, Victoria square was a transit point of mainly Afghan refugees, but 
also a few Moroccans and Tunisians. Large families with children as young as a few 
months old remained in the square through the day trying to arrange their 
transportation to Greece’s northern border.  
Local communities (encouraged by the positive attitude of the Greek state), 
demonstrated high levels of empathy towards displaced persons in 2015-2016 (cf. 
Kirtsoglou and Tsimouris 2015; Kirtsoglou 2018). Despite the generalised positive 
attitude of the Greek public towards the refugees, a number of interlocutors in the 
square expressed their concern and reservations especially towards young ‘foreign’ 
men who did not appear to be part of larger families. Can’t you see? (a local small-
business owner commented, pointing towards the direction of a company of young 
Afghan men) they are all of conscription age8. These are not refugees. They are an 
invading army. Amidst a strong spirit of solidarity exhibited towards the 2015-2016 
refugees, xenophobic voices (admittedly, usually belonging to the conservatives or 
the far-right) insisted that on the back of the ‘refugee crisis’, a number of ‘radical 
Muslims’ (skliropyrinikoi Mousoulmanoi) were entering Europe with the specific 
intention to ‘corrupt the ‘values of European civilisation’ (na alloiosoun tis aksies tou 
Europaikou politismou). The widely circulating (in Greece and generally in Europe) 
xenophobic narrative of ‘Muslim cultural invasion’ is of course another version of the 
official discourse, upheld by high-level policy figures, which transforms refugees to a 
                                                          
7 Between the summer of 2015 and the spring of 2016, approximately one million refugees crossed 
the Aegean from Turkey and Greece, before they eventually continued their journeys to Northern 
Europe through an unofficial humanitarian corridor which was closed in late February 2016. The 
majority of them were Syrians who fled the war, closely followed by Afghans, Iraqis and Kurds.  
8 In Greece conscription is compulsory.  
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security risk9 by claiming that Muslim terrorists, radicalised individuals, or terrorist 
sympathizers regularly infiltrate refugee populations. 
Following September 11 and the War on Terror, the young (single) Muslim man, 
imagined as culturally and racially different in ways that are incompatible with the 
imagined community of W.E.I.R.D10 nationals has become an iconic figure of radical 
alterity. The young Muslim man –similarly to the covered Muslim woman– is a 
synecdochical11 representation (cf. Vertovec 2011: 249; Bowen 2007: 246) of 
Islamophobia. The alleged incompatibility of Islam with ‘Western liberal values’ 
(dytikes dimokratikes aksies) has been repeatedly summarised by our Greek 
informants in the phrase ‘these people cannot be assimilated’ (autoi oi anthropoi den 
afomoionontai). The neo-colonial expectation that Muslims need to be ‘assimilated’ 
arises from widespread, orientalist understandings of Islam as generally inferior to 
Western cultural superiority (cf. Choudhury 2015). Anti-Muslim prejudice that leads 
to fully developed forms of racialised Islamophobia has been a prominent feature of 
colonial and post-colonial histories (ibid). The production of the Orient as a distinct 
and different entity (cf. Said 1979), inferior to the Occident (cf. Mandel et. al., 2015) 
rests on the systematic “coupling of modernity and civilisation with liberal Western 
law” –among other institutions– and the spirit of secularism (Choudhury 2015: 51). 
As Mahmood (2006) rightly observes however, when it comes to Islam, liberal 
politics do not actually promote secularisation, but rather attempt to control and 
transform religious expression in a fashion that is closer to liberal values.  
                                                          
9 See for instance the 2016 Risk Analysis of FRONTEX 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annula_Risk_Analysis_2016.pdf 
10 W.E.I.R.D stands for Western, Educated, Industrialised, Rich, Democratic. It is an especially popular 
acronym amongst various social scientists, especially experimental psychologists, that refers to 
biases arising from the demography of their samples. 
11 Vertovec employs the term synecdoche, a figure of speech whereby the part stands for the whole 
(pars for toto) to explain “the extraordinary symbolic weight” that certain images and symbols (like 
the head scarf) carry in public perception (2011: 249).  
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In the case of Greece – similarly to other European countries (Choudhury 2015: 55) 
– the state controls meticulously religious affairs. Unlike other European countries, 
the Greek state is far from secular in the liberal sense of the term (cf. Kravva 2003). 
Apart from the fact that the ministry of education is also the ministry of ‘religious 
affairs’ (ypourgeio paideias kai thriskeumaton), the Greek Orthodox Church is 
energetically engaged in the regulation of the religious landscape. For the last 
twenty years or so, Athens (that has, mostly as a result of immigration, a sizeable 
population of Muslims of different denominations) does not have an official mosque. 
The attempts of different centre-left governments to build one have been 
vehemently opposed by the Orthodox Church. Supported by conservatives and the 
far right, Christian Orthodox religious leaders mobilised the general public against 
the erection of a mosque. It is only in spring 2017 that relevant legislation finally 
gained parliamentary approval and it remains to be seen whether and when the 
mosque will be actually built. Until then, the Muslims of Athens are forced to pray in 
impromptu unofficial mosques hidden from the public eye. These literally separate 
and separated spaces of religious expression are only symptomatic of the general 
desire (echoed in the public speech of Dimoula) of many ordinary Greeks to remain–
as much as possible– physically and certainly socially apart from migrant 
populations.  
The politics of space affect much more than everyday sociality. The impoverished 
‘migrant neighbourhoods’ of central Athens, are being slowly transformed into 
unsafe spaces for all kinds of residents (cf. Veikou 2016: 156), introducing new 
asymmetries between the rich (who have the economic power to desert them) and 
the poor who have no other choice but to remain in them. Migrants of first, and often 
second generation, are condemned to a “perpetual status of allochthony 
(foreigness)” and remain “marginalised along class [and] racial lines” (Silverstein 
2005: 366).  
Racialised Islamophobia is certainly one of the decisive factors of the partial 
presence and the persisting abjection of certain migrant populations. Images of the 
‘radical’ Islam as politically threatening, culturally inferior and incompatible with 
12 
 
‘modern values’, were first introduced to Greece by the media as a result of 
September 11 and the War on Terror (cf. Kirtsoglou 2013). Gradually, Islamophobic 
attitudes expanded and became dominant in public discourse. The literature does 
not provide a unified definition of Islamophobia (cf. Klug 2012). Most authors follow 
Bleich’s description of the phenomenon as ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes and 
emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’ (2012; cf also Helbling 2012: 6; Borell 2015: 
411). There is however considerable debate over whether the term is analytically 
useful, or supportive of further simplifications and essentialist assumptions about 
the existence of an undifferentiated Islam (cf. Halliday 1999). Other authors insist on 
the usefulness of the term in special relation to the racialization of Muslims (cf. Rana 
2007; Meer and Modood 2010). “The figure of the Muslim”, Klug argues, “is 
essentially a figment of fiction; any resemblance to real Muslims, living or dead is 
purely incidental. But when this fantasy figure is projected onto the screen of reality, 
Muslims as Muslims morph into the ‘other’ essentially different from ‘us’ (2012: 678’ 
cf. also Esposito and Kalin 2011; Allen 2010; Morey and Yaquin 2011).  
The political and historical construction of the radical alterity of the Muslim ‘Other, 
is not unrelated to political and historical processes of the past (colonialism) and the 
present (American imperialism) (cf. Sheehi 2011). The alleged incommensurability 
of Islamic and Christian or secular traditions is also intimately connected to neo-
liberal understandings and figurations of subjectivity. Echoing Zizek (2010), Veikou 
pointedly observes that “in today’s liberal multiculturalism the experience of the 
other must be deprived of its otherness” (2016: 163). Commenting on the effects of 
liberal political philosophy and cultural agenda, Zizek claims that we are prepared to 
tolerate immigrants insofar as they become ‘detoxified from their dangerous 
qualities’ (2010; Veikou 2016: 163). This ‘lighter’ version of Islam takes the form of 
what Ramadan calls ‘Euro-Islam’, represented in the figure of a “Muslim personality, 
faithful to the principles of Islam, dressed in European and Americal cultures, and 
definitely rooted in Western societies” (2004: 4; cf. Mandel et. al., 2015: 366). 
Separating Muslims into followers of a ‘good’ or a ‘bad’ Islam (cf. Kumar 2013) is 
characteristic of discourses prevalent in Greece (similarly to the rest of Europe) and 
13 
 
representative of a wider tendency of distinguishing ‘good’ from ‘bad’ migrants. 
Reminiscent of financial tools12 this (neo)liberal vision of other religious and 
cultural communities rests on specific conceptualisations of agency and the 
autonomous subject (cf. Mahmood 2005) who is capable–and indeed expected– to 
transform oneself in order to fit in wider societal structures (cf. Pedwell 2012). Just 
as ‘becoming a good Muslim’ relates to reconfiguring one’s religious subjectivity in 
ways that are culturally congruent with liberal values, becoming ‘a good migrant’ is 
connected to the neoliberal vision of upward mobility through hard work (cf. Erel, 
Murji and Nahaboo 2016: 1348). In the third and final section that follows, we will 
concisely discuss the passage from ‘Albanophobia’ to representations of Albanians as 
‘integrated’ migrants in Greece, in an attempt to further decipher the hegemonic 
character of the concept of migrant ‘integration’ and its intimate connection to 
liberal perceptions of what constitutes ‘migrant success’.  
 
C. From Albanophobia to becoming (like a) Greek: constructing the ‘good’ and 
the ‘bad’ migrant.  
Greece, classified for most of its history as a predominantly migrant-sending state, 
started receiving significant numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers since the late 
eighties. Since then, approximately one million immigrants arrived in Greece, at first 
mostly from Balkan countries.  Around 56% of the newcomers were of Albanian 
origin.13  
The Greek state was legislatively ill-prepared to receive considerable numbers of 
migrants (Pratsinakis 2014: 1298). The immigration law of 1991 was conceived as 
part of a ‘zero immigration’ policy aim (ibid). Successive legislative frameworks (as 
                                                          
12 We refer here to strategies like the dissolving of financial institutions into their ‘good’ and ‘bad 
constituents on the basis of ‘good debt’ (regularly served) and ‘bad debt’ (non-regularly served, or 
not served at all).   
13 http://www.immigrantwomen.gr/portal/images/ektheseis/statistika_dedomena.metanaston.pdf  
(p. 6.)     
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late as 2010) remained organised around the principle of jus sanguinis and directly 
or indirectly supported a “silent policy of tolerance towards the entry of cheap 
foreign labour due to pressures from employers of small-labour intensive units, 
trying to survive the competition through numerical flexibilisation, or from farmers 
who needed extra seasonal labour” (Lazaridis and Koumandraki 2001: 287).  
The case of Albanian migrants, as the iconic representatives of economic 
immigration to Greece, showcases the elaborate connections between migration and 
neoliberal governmentality. It reveals the manner in which state policies and public 
perceptions of racialised cultural differentialism aided by liberal visions of 
subjectivity coalesce in the creation of hierarchies of entitlement and asymmetrical 
political, social and economic relations. The different permutations of racism, we 
argue, are inspired by historical relations of exploitation and firmly established in 
the present socio-economic and ideological context that fosters racialised structures 
of exploitation specific to migrant populations (cf. Anderson et. al., 2011).  Labour 
relations, irregularity and deportability (De Genova 2002; 2010), as well as notions 
of the ‘self-made’, upwardly mobile, hard-working migrant form the complex pattern 
of (neo)liberal governmentality of immigration.  
Irregularity and deportability were established in Greece through bordering 
practices, ‘sweep’ police operations frequently launched in major city-centres, 
cumbersome naturalisation procedures, and the absence of a long term, sensible 
reception and integration plan on behalf of the Greek state (cf. Papailias 2003; 
Christopoulos 2006; Cabot 2014). Successive Greek governments (socialist and 
conservative) succumbed to the domestic demands of employees and dealt with 
immigrants as cheap labour regulated by the needs of the parallel economy and the 
black labour market (Cholezas and Tsakloglou 2009, Triandafyllidoy and Ambrosini 
2011). The absence of appropriate legislative frameworks resulted in the legal limbo 
of as many as 700,000 immigrants (cf. Pratsinakis 2014: 1298) creating the space 
for the proliferation of illegal and exploitative labour relations (Lazaridis and 
Poyako-Theotoki 1999).  
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The relationship between ‘configurations of illegality’ promoted by migration 
regimes (cf De Genova 2006: 2), and the manner in which “policies do not only 
impose conditions… but  [also] influence people’s indigenous norms of conduct” 
(Shore and Wright 1997: 6) has been long established in migration studies’ 
literature (cf. Andreas 2009; Vertovec 2011: 246-248). In the case of Greece, state-
led irregularity, illegality and the reduction of Albanian immigrants to non-citizens 
promoted a generalized condition of moral panic in public discourse and the media 
(Papastergiou and Takou 2013). Immigrants were constructed as either (and both) a 
class dangereuse (cf. Lazaridis and Wickens 1999: 646) and as the precarious 
proletariat of a society that was becoming increasingly fascinated with consumption. 
Albanian immigrants were tolerated in as much as they provided cheap labour, 
performing the difficult tasks that local people gradually avoided.  In this context any 
discussion about human or legal rights of the immigrants was deflected, or 
dismissed as ‘unpatriotic’. So much so, that on one occasion, representatives of 
farmer associations in Macedonia, North Greece, protested against deportations of 
Albanian migrants on the account of being deprived of manual workers to cover for 
their seasonal needs and demanded that foreign workers were deported only after 
the end of the agricultural season. 
Perhaps the most telling example of exclusion however, was the issue of the ‘flag’ in 
the early 2000s. Twice a year, during national celebration days Greek students 
participate in parades held throughout Greece. The best student of the school (the 
one with the highest GPA) holds the flag and leads the rest of the group. In 2000 the 
best student was of Albanian origin. Parents and the community in a small suburb of 
Thessaloniki (Northern Greece) demanded that the ‘Albanian’ boy was not allowed 
to hold the Greek flag. Despite the fact that the relevant law and the ministry of 
education were clear that the student could parade holding the flag, since he had the 
highest GPA, the hostility of parents and the local community forced him to 
withdraw (Tzanelli 2006). Apart from the ultra-nationalist rhetoric which 
proclaimed that the flag is a national symbol and thus should not be carried by a 
non-national person, what is important to note here is that immigrants (even those 
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born or raised in Greece) were not allowed to participate in the heritage and history 
of the ethnos, while at the same time they were also disallowed from celebrating 
their own history and heritage. Characteristic of the latter is the case of a reception 
teacher reported to the relevant authorities by the parents’ association because she 
encouraged Albanian students to draw the flags of their own countries and pinned 
them on the wall next to the Greek ones.  
Denying immigrants the right to exist as cultural and historical subjects, or to even 
partake in the national culture and history is a form of existential violence, 
paradigmatic of modern Greek resistance to cosmopolitanism both as an ethical and 
as a political project (cf. Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010/2013). The status 
and notion of the economic migrant, further reduces persons, and eventually entire 
populations, to the status or precarious proletarians. Being a ‘worker’ (cf. Arendt 
1958), becomes the defining feature that determines one’s conditions of personhood 
(cf. Veikou 2016: 159 ) in the context of an unequal ‘immigrant-native power 
struggle’, that shapes dominant “perceptions about how immigrants should behave 
and what their position should be” in a given society (Pratsinakis 2014: 1297). As 
Virdee has demonstrated, in the English context, racialization of the ‘other’ was 
mediated by the state and the hegemonic narratives of the elite and became a 
constituent force in the development of ‘white’ working class identity, which 
coalesced around colour and religion (2014) In the case of Albanians and other 
migrant subjects in Greece, this unequal power struggle is explicated in the 
ambivalent feelings of the state and Greek society as a whole towards migrant 
populations that are regarded –on the one hand– as a desirable labour force and –
simultaneously– as a class of undesirable citizens. Caught in this paradox, whole 
generations of immigrants, since the late eighties adopted different ‘integration’ 
strategies compatible with (neo)liberal values and the demands of ‘local’ societies 
that ‘foreigners’ are only partially present in Greek social life. That is, unless they 
are/become rich or famous.   
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Before proceeding to explain how upward mobility and the subjectivity of the ‘hard-
working person’ became the major integration avenues for different generations of 
immigrants in Greece we would like to clarify our use of the term neoliberalism in 
this section. As Hall (2011) argues, neoliberalism is not a singular force restricted to 
the financial sector. As a vehicle of liberal values, it becomes the organising principle 
of different spectrums of society and culture (ibid). Neoliberal governmentality as “a 
set of actions” (Foucault 1997:92-93) affects in diverse ways different subjects, 
countries and regions modifying previous hierarchies, forms of governance and 
modes of subjectification.  
In the case of Albanian immigrants, upward mobility facilitated their acceptance by 
Greek society, to the point that a number of our respondents would refer to second 
generation Albanians as ‘having become (like) Greeks’ (ehoun ginei (san) Ellines). 
Pratsinakis (2014) discusses the integration of Albanian migrants in Greece 
comparing it to the case of Former Soviet Union (FSU) subjects who immigrated to 
the country approximately in the same period. Pratsinakis reports how his Northern 
Greek respondents appeared to prefer Albanian immigrants from FSU Pontian 
Greeks (2014: 1303). Despite the fact that both groups were mostly employed in 
physically demanding, low-skilled and underpaid jobs, Pontian Greeks were 
reproached for maintaining their linguistic and cultural distinctiveness, asking for 
‘rights’ (dikaiomata) and making use of state resources (ibid: 1299-1303; cf. also 
Voutyra 2004). Albanian immigrants on the other hand were portrayed as “peaceful, 
hardworking” individuals “who caused no problems” in the community (ibid: 1303).  
Despite being still victimised and vilified, Albanian migrants –left on their own 
devices– managed to adapt to an array of cultural, religious and (neo)liberal 
expectations. Through mass baptisms, by concealing or underplaying their religious 
affiliation, by presenting themselves as ‘soft’ Muslims who participate in instances of 
drinking conviviality in rural coffee-shops, through exhibiting a hard working ethos, 
and linguistic competence, Albanian immigrants attested to what Hage (2000) calls 
‘practical nationality’. By ‘practical cultural nationality’ Hage refers to styles and 
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practices that assume the form of cultural capital and afford the bearer certain 
degrees of national inclusion (2000: 51-62).   
The case of first and second generation Albanian ‘good’ migrants, is indicative of the 
kaleidoscopic relationship between culturalist, nationalist, racialised, neoliberal and 
neo-colonial understandings of the place and ‘ideal’ trajectory of the migrant in 
Greece and Europe in general. Modern Greek phobic and ambivalent attitudes 
towards migrant populations are not of course unrelated to the hegemonic dogma of 
Greek political elites that Greece–culturally, economically and historically–belongs to 
the West (cf. Kirtsoglou 2006; 2010). The Western, liberal orientation of Greek 
national culture, crystallised in popular ideology in a fashion that supported 
ambivalent and often hostile attitudes towards ‘oriental others’ (compare with 
Virdee 2014). In this sense, our research attests to the validity of Ong’s call for “a 
broader conception of race and [cultural] citizenship shaped by the history of 
European imperialism” (Ong 1996:738).  
 
Concluding remarks  
The present paper attempted a critical and ethnographically informed reading of 
contemporary literature on the complex assemblage of linkages between migration, 
racialization and liberal values in modern Greece as a symptomatic case of European 
attitudes to migration. Our main argument supports the idea that we need a holistic, 
intersectional and unified framework for the analysis of contemporary migration, 
reception and integration conditions. Echoing the approach of Vertovec (2011), we 
offered ethnographic evidence of how migrants are routinely produced as racially, 
religiously and culturally differentiated subjects supposedly threatening to the 
cohesion of particular nations and of ‘western’ liberal values. In line with recent 
scholarship on racialization and Islamophobia the paper discussed novel forms of 
racism that go beyond notions of biological difference and support the construction 
of hierarchies and geographies of entitlement. Processes of inclusion and exclusion, 
we argued, rest on a meshwork (cf. Ingold 2011), of seemingly disparate notions and 
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identification markers such as culture, religion, gender, descent, modernisation and 
progress (to name some), which form a fluid and shifting reservoir of convenient 
story seeds (cf. Knight 2013) about the self and the other. In the absence of a 
definable organising principle of inclusion and exclusion we proposed that 
citizenship and membership to national and supranational bodies ultimately rests 
on the hegemonic acceptance of (neo)liberal regimes of subjectification and of an 
array of ‘European’ values that form the basis of a universalist hegemonic vision of 
the world. We traced racialization back to an imagined ‘orient’ (cf. Said 1979), but 
also to contemporary cultural and political imperialist projects. Ultimately, this 
paper traced the limits of cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism to the requisites 
for mobility and difference established in the ambiguities of state policies, legal 
frameworks, everyday sociality and the spaces in-between desirable and 
undesirable migrants.     
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